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Abstract 
How does emigration affect the politics of the country of origin? This paper argues 
that emigration is constitutive of subject-making processes within the sending state. 
Steering away from instrumentalist approaches that treat it as a prudential act, cross-
border mobility is here examined as licensed political participation. By engaging in (or 
abstaining from) migration, citizens embed themselves deeper into specific social 
norms and practices as defined, discursively and substantively, by governmental 
policies. The act of migration, thus, allows citizens to infuse meaning into distinct 
social orders and engage in subject-making processes. The empirical case of modern 
Egypt demonstrates how such an approach can shed light upon the ways through 
which political structures are affected by emigration in non-democracies. In the 
divergent approaches to migration under President Nasser and, later, under Presidents 
Sadat and Mubarak, lie two different normative 'constructions' of the Egyptian subject: 
the frugal, self-sufficient Egyptian who rejects emigration under Nasser is contrasted 
with the self-interested, profit-seeking Egyptian subject-migrant under Sadat and 
Mubarak. By highlighting this opposition through the framework of cross-border 
mobility, this paper seeks to shed light into the multiple resonances that migration has 
as a subject-making process, and enhance our understanding of the politics of 
emigration under non-democratic regimes. 
INTRODUCTION 
How does the phenomenon of emigration politically affect the country of 
origin? Does emigration lead to a reconfiguration of the workings of political 
power within that country and, if so, in what ways? This paper attempts to 
answer these questions by approaching population mobility as an act of 
political participation. 1 In contrast to part of the literature that considers 
11ligrants to be auton011l0US actors 11laking rational decisions, 11ligrants are 
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viewed here as subjects who operate within a political community that features 
distinct sets of rules and demarcated fields of action. A citizen's migration, or 
abstention from migration, constitutes an act oflicensed political participation 
insofar as that citizen responds to given situations within the political sphere; 
yet, that sphere is also marked by strict criteria of exclusion and inclusion that 
determine what kinds of activity should be allowed. Through this participatory 
act, citizens are not affirming their sovereign will; they are immersing 
themselves deeper in a specific social order. In this reading, emigration is a 
political act that responds not simply to governmental policy but also to 
diverse practices throughout the social body. Thus, one's engagement with, or 
abstention from, the act of migration gives meaning not only to formal 
government regulations, but also to expectations within the social world. In 
what ways do government practices interact with manners and forms of social 
interaction, and how do they form migration as a participatory act that one is 
expected to follow, or abstain from? 
To approach such questions, one must examine how political ideas on 
migration become socially constituted frames of reference, leading citizens to 
make sense of their daily lives and define their engagement with power. 
Migration is seen as an act of interpellation, through which the citizen, by 
responding to particular forms of government and social norms, contributes 
to the reinforcement and reproduction of modes of political power. 2 Put 
differently, in order to comprehend the power of migration as an act of 
participation, one must delineate the ascribed roles that citizens are asked to 
perform, sketching the manner in which political ideas are disseminated, take 
on meaning, and become dominant. In line with this reasoning, the discourse 
on migration is approached as the mutual constitution of conceptions and 
practices, in an attempt at identifying both how power organizes around 
migration, and the possibilities of resistance. 
This work focuses on the Middle East in an effort to steer research 
away from essentialist claims of exceptionalism ascribed to Arab, Muslim, or 
Middle East culture. While each region is endowed with its own socio-political 
specificities, there are multiple parallels that can be drawn between the Middle 
East and other areas, such as Latin America or Southeast Asia, in terms of the 
centrality of migration in the countries of origin' political structures. The focus 
on the Middle East also allows for an exploration of the varieties oflocalized 
meanings behind migration as an act of political participation within the 
country of origin. Thus, this paper aims to add to the growing, albeit mainly 
Subject-Making Processes 31 
Western-oriented, interest in the matter, particularly by comparative politics 
scholars. 
As a region, the Middle East has been historically rich in population 
movements. That said, the choice of modern Egypt as a case study is based on 
two factors. First, the country has a historical standing as the largest regional 
provider of migrant labor. 3 Second, the qualitative variety of migratory 
processes throughout the history of modern Egypt, and their quantitative 
increase in the post-1973 period have endowed the Egyptian case with a vast 
array of writings, debates, customs, and social rituals on migration, whose 
discursive importance has been unexamined by the literature. This paper 
argues that discourse on migration under Nasser reflected a broader 
collectivist ethos, under which the theme of population movement was 
employed to discipline Egyptian citizens in accordance with the regime's 
ideology of statism-developmentalism.4 In sharp contrast to this, migration 
and, more specifically, return migration under Sadat and Mubarak was 
employed to promote an individualization of responsibility, as citizens 
disciplined themselves to use their freedom in making responsible choices 
under a broader turn towards neoliberalism.5 
This paper's aims reflect the choice of research methods. It employs 
mUltiple interviews with elites and experts conducted in Cairo, as well as a 
discursive analysis of archival government documents, presidential speeches 
and published interviews, and political memoirs, together with content 
analysis of how the three major semi-governmental daily newspapers in Egypt 
covered the issue of migration in the 1952-2010 period (al-Ahrarn, al-Akhbar, 
al-lurnhuriya).6 The paper also employs an ethnographic examination of the 
long-term impact of emigration on citizens in the urban Cairo setting 
conducted between july 2013 and March 2014, in order to shed light on how 
citizens internalize, implelnent, or transform these discourses. 7 Its structure is 
as follows: first, the paper examines how the concept of citizens' political 
participation can shed light on the socio-political effects of migratory 
processes within the country of origin. It then proceeds to analyze how the 
Egyptian regime under Nasser and, subsequently, during the Sadat and 
Mubarak period strategically utilized the theme of migration in dialectically 
shaping citizens in accordance with the regime's respective priorities. Building 
on the contrast between the two periods, the paper argues that migration 
constitutes a form of political participation that serves not only as a socially 
constituted frame of reference, but also as a means of determining the criteria 
of political inclusion and exclusion within a political community. 
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UNDERSTANDING MIGRATION THROUGH THE LENS OF SUBJECT-
MAKING 
'Keep away from those who stuff themselves after they have starved' 
Egyptian proverb 
Despite the rISIng interest of social scientists in the phenomenon of 
emigration,s the literature has yet to address how migration affects subject-
making processes in the country of origin. The socioeconomic effects of 
emigration and return have traditionally featured within the broader 
scholarship on labor migration, a field which has shed little overall light onto 
the ways through which the complex processes of emigration and return shape 
citizens. Neo-classical readings typically espouse the individualist rationale of 
incOlne-maximizing migrants, while the 'new economics of Inigration' and 
economic sociology put forth a similarly depoliticized narrative of migration 
as a calculated strategy. However, in assigning a methodological individualism 
to the study of migration, both approaches operate under certain assumptions; 
most commonly, that migration is a prudential act of autonomous subjects. 
Overall, such works tend to be hampered by a totalizing, Schumpeterian 
emphasis on migrants as entrepreneurial individuals possessing perfect 
information. More often than not, they also tend to neglect that the 
phenomenon of migration encompasses mUltiple processes, of which 
emigration and return constitute only a part.' 
Recent work within anthropology, cultural studies, and sociology has 
questioned the image of the migrant as the rational utility-maximizing actor 
by undermining the economic logic of studies on return migration,lO as well as 
emphasizing cross-national familial, social and religious ties,'! global political 
agendas,12 and social, rather than Inerely economic, remittances, 13 However, 
an (over-) emphasis on agency shifts focus to migrants' intentions rather than 
the ordering of politics per se: if one questions the consciousness of citizens' 
act of migration (and return), or the degree offreedom to do so within specific 
social norms and expectations, then this literature's analytic utility falls 
somewhat short. On the other hand, the validity of purely determinist 
accounts, under which one's actions and roles cannot be modified, or even 
challenged, is similarly dubious: the history of political participation, and the 
practice of migration in particular, abound with instances of interpellated 
subjects resisting their ascribed roles or reneging on their social expectations. 
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How can the effects of migration be approached not simply through 
the interaction between the citizen and state regulations, but also through 
interactions with practices spread across the social body? In an attempt to 
bypass the pitfalls of the aforementioned epistemologies, this paper treats 
migration as a political act of citizens who are neither autonomous subjects 
nor inherently rational actors. Rather, their contingent choices and 
experiences take place within a wider system of rights and obligations, 
reinvented traditions, personal or familial networks, and religious normativity. 
Political acts are, thus, produced, and contested, through discourses and 
practices that emanate from both the government and the social world. By 
drawing upon the writings of Foucault, this approach allows a shift of focus 
away from the limiting concept of the state, which now "appears simply as one 
element-whose functionality is historically specific and contextually 
variable-in multiple circuits of power, connecting a diversity of authorities 
and forces, within a whole variety of complex assemblages. "14 At the same time, 
once we are able to "escape the neat division between state and society," this 
reading enables an examination of "practices of power as they are deployed at 
the micro level of everyday life."15 
How would such a conceptualization shed light onto the complex 
phenomenon of migration? Anthropologists like Ong and Coutin provide 
ethnographic examples of how citizenship can be dialectically produced by 
Asian and Salvadorian immigrants in the United States, yet their analyses leave 
out any discussion of similar processes within immigrants' country of origin. I" 
The issue of whether power structures in immigrants' home countries affected 
them, or continue to affect them, is left unanswered. In a recent examination 
of migration processes in the Philippines and India, Rodriguez and Schwenken 
attempt to answer this question by arguing that "labour-sending states set the 
regulatory frameworks and co-produce 'ideal migrant subjects' from which 
other social actors draw or contest."17 Their examination, however, eschews 
social processes by focusing on institutional mechanisms-such as formal 
recruitment processes and training centers-that emphasize the state as an 
object separate from society. At the same time, a broader theoretical question 
relnains with regard to migration processes in non-democratic contexts. If 
authoritarian regimes are sufficiently concerned about population movements 
to establish migration-related institutions,'8 how do they shape the structure 
of the imaginative frameworks within which their subjects participate? In this 
matter, the case of Egypt provides enlightening insights. 
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EGYPTIAN EMIGRATION & SUBJECT-MAKING PROCESSES UNDER 
PRESIDENT NASSER, 1954-1970 
'To build factories is easy; to build hospitals and schools is possible; but to build a 
nation of men is a hard and difficult task.' 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, National Assembly Speech, 1957 
The 1952 creation of the modern Egyptian state and Nasser's subsequent 
ascent to power coincided with a rise in diverse forms of emigration, despite 
various institutional restrictions on such population movements. The exodus 
of Egyptian jews was coupled with the emigration of political dissenters 
(royalist supporters of the ancien regime; communists; Muslim Brothers) and 
foreigners (primarily Greeks, Italians, and Syrians). 19 More than forty 
thousand Egyptians were working abroad in the Yemen Arab Republic,2() as 
were a few thousand in Syria during its short-lived unification with Egyp!.21 
Rising numbers of high-skilled Egyptians would pursue temporary work 
across the Middle East and Africa, under the aegis of the Egyptian Ministry of 
Education." A Significant number of Egyptian students studying abroad never 
returned to Egypt,23 while a growing percentage of Copts permanently left 
Egypt for North America, Europe, and Australia,24 particularly following the 
introduction of the 1956 Constitution, which introduced Islam as an official 
religion.25 
What is striking about these movements is that, in their vast majority, 
they were not openly acknowledged by the Egyptian regime, despite the fact 
that Nasser was wise to the political importance of emigration, as can be 
deduced from his privately aired concerns about rising jewish migration to 
Israel and the Israeli presence in newly independent African states. Partially in 
response to Israeli policy, which Nasser termed as a "mask of imperialism," the 
President significantly expanded upon the policy of targeted temporary 
emigration (particularly Egyptian teachers, nurses, scientists, or military 
experts) to Arab and African states; 26 once there, they contributed to the 
spreading ofNasserist "political propaganda,"27 according to the doctrine that 
Egypt "as a revolution" would not maintain the territorial boundaries of Egypt 
"as a state."28 As a result, in Libya, as elsewhere in the Arab world, Egyptian 
high-skilled professionals were subject to frequent deportations as a result of 
their political activism. 29 The overarching political character of such 
emigration is further stressed by the fact that most of these emigrants' wages 
abroad were paid by the Egyptian government rather than the host states.3D 
Nasser's concern regarding mass elnigration is also evident in the numerous 
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measures he adopted and resources he devoted to prevent such movements in 
his earlier years,}] while governmental reports further show how the regime 
would later consider emigration as a solution to Egypt's problem of 
'astronomical' overpopulation.32 
Throughout his tenure as preSident, Nasser would rarely publicly 
discuss the issue of migration. The Egyptian state never released details 
concerning the emigration of Egyptian Jews; rather, one has to rely on private 
accounts or the reports of international organizations. State statistics on the 
departure of Egyptian Copts are, similarly, unavailable. This lacuna comes in 
sharp contrast with a long history of state record keeping in Egypt, and the 
otherwise detailed statistical accounts collected and methodically published by 
the state under Nasser. Even the word diaspora (al-shatat) has been, to this 
day, largely shunned in official rhetoric due to its association with the creation 
of the Israeli state." Instead, if asked about migration, Nasser would brnsh it 
off, often stating that "Egyptians don't migrate."" In doing so, he generalized 
upon the long-standing belief in the Egyptian fallilhin's (farmers') attachment 
to the land and their "state of apathy" towards emigration, a belief that traces 
its roots to the nineteenth century.35 Of course, the phenomena of internal 
migration and urbanization in Egypt throughout the twentieth century-let 
alone the population movements listed above-had long debunked the validity 
of this myth. Yet, as the political act of migration (or, more precisely, the 
dismissal of migration as an act) became associated with a distinct field of 
meaning, the belief in an "attachment to the land" was made credible within 
the N asserist social order. 
The plausibility of this narrative relied upon a strong degree of 
association and cohesion with the regime's overall ideology. Behind Nasser's 
public assertions that "everybody knows that Egyptians do not like to 
emigrate,"36 the President constructed a broader belief system about the duties, 
rights, and expected conduct of a citizen. The belief system operated in line 
with other frames of reference, particularly Egyptian nationalism coupled with 
distrust of "reactionary" neighboring countries and the two Cold War 
superpowers, and a statist-developmentalist program whose success relied on 
ample domestic manpower. At the same time, normative guidelines were put 
in place that omitted migration from subjects' repertoire of action: the 
rejection of migration attained a moral weight as the broad demonization of 
migratory movements ultimately enabled life outside of Egypt to be presented 
as a type of punishment. The regime would duly publicize how it stripped 
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communists, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, or other "traitors to the 
state" of their Egyptian nationality, barring their return to the country." 
The discourse on migration, in effect, allowed Nasser to "construct" 
the citizen, individually and collectively, around the regime's broader 
ideational priorities. On an individualleve!, the President would repeatedly 
demonize any cases of greed or corruption, discouraging the self-interested 
pursuit of profit in favor of collective concern for the state." This was the 
explicit rationale behind Nasser's policy of taklif (mandatory work), which 
forbade migration of specific professions, until one had been employed within 
Egypt for a set number of years. More broadly, Nasser would applaud practices 
that discouraged consumerism, thereby delineating Egyptian citizens' fields of 
action within specified parameters of socio-political disposition. Overall, a 
citizen who wished to migrate came to contradict the oft-stated principles of 
autarky and frugality upon which the Nasserist regime relied: 
There are certain notions which should be discarded like extravagance 
and luxury. Today I would like to say a thing or two about 
extravagance. Every pound we save in constructing a factory 
contributes to the national wealth and, by increasing these savings, we 
can build another factory and thus provide, for example, one hundred 
individuals with work [ ... J No one should think only of himself. Those 
of us who lead a comfortable life do so at the expense of others." 
On a collective leve!, the perceived absence of migration helped pave the way 
for the establishment of "the new SOCiety;" one, the regime argued, that was 
being "built along the lines of a democratic, cooperative socialism. The 
principal aims of the government are to raise the standard of living, and to 
afford equal opportunities to all citizens."40 The lack of emigration, the regime 
argued, mirrored a sound economic policy. Put differently, there was no need 
to move abroad given the ample employment opportunities within Egypt. 
"Ours is not a poor state, brothers, but a rich one," Nasser would elTIphasize. 41 
In associating the lack of migration with state development, the regime 
associated the act of emigration with a lack of belief in the Nasserist state, or a 
wish to undermine it. Complementary government policies entrenched the 
absence of migration within broader modes of action: the Land Reform Law, 
for instance, discouraged migration by providing ample work opportunities 
for Egyptian farmers. Nasser's 1964 siyilsat al-ta'yin (graduate appointment 
policy), which stipulated that the state would provide public sector 
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employment for every Egyptian citizen who graduates from university, further 
undermined economic incentives for emigration.42 
Overall, despite the fact that population movements were not only 
visible by, but highly disruptive to Egyptian society, the regime discursively 
downplayed such movements in delineating the framework in which political 
subjects were encouraged to participate. Thus, the regime's approach to 
migration shaped subjects' conceptions of meaningful political participation 
and, introduced a degree of disconnect between the "model" Egyptian citizen 
and those who had left the country. Remaining in Egypt, in other words, made 
sense, whereas emigrating largely did not. Indications of the regime's success 
in making this discourse hegemonic can be found in the commonly held view, 
still promoted today, that Egyptians did not emigrate under Nasser, and that 
view's routine reproduction in the relevant scholarship as a broader truth," 
further obscuring the socio-political importance of population movements 
that occurred during Nasser's reign." 
As a result, this period's diverse population movements have 
essentially been relegated into aberrations, or unintentional lnishaps, 
hindering their examination as part and parcel of the regime's production of 
power. More importantly, the Nasserist regime was able to morally justify its 
restriction of subjects' repertoire of actions, by putting forth social norms that 
it professed to be more important than individual freedom: "When will 
Egyptians [ ... J be permitted to travel freely abroad [1]" an American journalist 
asked Nasser in 1959. "When we have a surplus of foreign currencies which we 
can spend on luxury and on summer vacations in Europe and America," he 
replied tersely." 
EGYPTIAN EMIGRATION AND THE NEOLIBERAL SUBJECT UNDER 
PRESIDENTS SADAT AND MUBARAK, 1970-2011 
'{The President} dressed in the latestfashion while we slept ten in a room.' 
Slogan of the 1977 "Bread Riots"'" 
By September 1969, Nasser had decided to completely abolish emigration, 
suspending all exit permits.47 His successor, however, saw matters differently: 
Anwar Sadat introduced migration into the Egyptian subject's repertoire of 
political action in 1971-a year after he assumed the presidency, following 
Nasser's death. The new President proceeded to abolish the long tradition of 
exit visas, border controls, and other restrictions, 4R while he negotiated 
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bilateral agreements that would allow Egyptians entry to foreign countries 
such as Libya or Syria with any official document of identification. 49 
Meanwhile, the press ran frequent articles about "an increased demand for 
Egyptian manpower" abroad.50 Newspapers would duly list foreign countries' 
labor shortages that were to be filled by Egyptians: "2,500 Egyptian building 
workers leave for Bulgaria;"Sl "15,000 workers for Czechoslovakia,"52 and so 
on-statements of profound importance given the dire economic conditions 
within Egypt. 
The regime now rejected Egyptians' attachment to the land as an "old 
stereotype."" Wage differentials between Egypt and foreign countries were 
widely publicized-schoolteachers, for instance, earned more in four years' 
work in the Gulf than in their entire working life if they stayed in Egypt." By 
1978, one account estimated that 15 to 18 percent of Egypt's active workforce 
was employed abroad.55 As the regime stated in its five-year plan: 
Growing numbers of Egyptians work abroad for very high wages, if 
compared with domestic salaries. These individuals return to Egypt 
possessed of high purchasing powers, which they usually direct not to 
saving and investment but to flagrant and luxurious consumption [ ... ] 
Therefore, our manpower and resources must be planned to meet the 
prerequisites of progress for trained manpower, and supply trained 
personnel to the Arab countries." 
In this rupture with past practices, the Sadat regime replaced Nasser's 
pseudo-historic repertoires about Egyptians' attachment to the land with a 
sustained language of liberalization. This was made clear by the inclusion of 
the right to migration in the 1971 Constitution: Article 52 stipulated that 
"citizens shall now have the right to permanent or temporary migration."" In 
the past, as Sadat wrote, Egyptians were "turned into puppets. They became 
dummies in the hands of their rulers, who did with them as they pleased. 
People were not allowed to travel [ ... ]."" Now, however, a subject's repertoire 
of actions was to be guided by freedom. "I want to make it clear," Sadat 
repeatedly argued, "that if we do not hold to the complete freedom of the 
individual in the shadow of competition, we cannot realize any progress. He 
who wants to travel, let him travel. "59 In line with the shift towards freedom of 
movement, the state retreated from administering any effective control over 
emigration, including keeping count of emigration-related statistics.6() Thus, 
the Sadat regime was able to grossly inflate estimates of Egyptians abroad, 
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further fueling social pressure towards emigration6 ! Already in 1971, Sadat 
would publicly boast that "there had never been as many young people 
migrating as there have been this year."" Without official statistics, figures 
became exaggerated, as state officials would broadly refer to "millions" of 
workers living abroad. In 1978, for instance, while the International Labor 
Organization estimated 403,908 Egyptian emigrants to be working in Arab 
countries, al-Ahram put the number to 1,390,000." 
At the same time, to sustain this radical shift towards migration, 
particularly to the oil-rich Arab countries, Sadat also drew upon an ethical 
repertoire hedged around the issue of religion.64 The new President presented 
himself as the al-ra'!s al-mu'min (the pious president); rarely would his 
speeches not begin, or end, with a reference to the Qur'an, while state media 
began duly reporting the mosques where Sadat would perform his Friday 
prayers. The importance of religiously conservative Arab countries-mainly 
Saudi Arabia-for Egypt's future was highlighted in newspapers, with reports 
repeating how Egyptian manpower and Saudi wealth could complement each 
other for mutual benefit. Egypt's military victory against Israel in 1973, with 
the help of the oil embargo imposed by neighboring Arab countries, was 
contrasted with the defeat of Nasser's Egypt in 1967, further normalizing the 
centrality of oil-rich Arab countries to Egypt's new social order. Sadat 
promised that the 1973 War-or the "crossing of the Canal"-would be 
followed by Egypt's "second crossing, the crossing to prosperity."" Egyptian 
migration, in this context, would also be a gesture of help towards the Saudi 
state's large demand for labor, and would add to the intended interdependence 
between the two countries. This, for Sadat, was a matter of pride: the President 
was initially adamant on naming one of the Suez Canal districts after the Saudi 
King.66 In his reconciliation with the Gulf states, the President also made clear 
that the state was now willing to receive all "her sons" who had been forced to 
reside abroad, and reinstate Egyptian citizenship to them-marking the return 
of Muslim Brothers who had escaped to the Gulf and had been stripped of their 
nationality by Nasser.67 
This shift in discourse radically modified Egyptian citizens' repertoire 
of political behavior according to the new regime's priorities. On an individual 
level, the return of religiously radical elements that had emigrated under 
Nasser marked a steady shift towards conservatism in universities, professional 
associations, and, gradually, in the overall sociopolitical landscape of Egypt. At 
the same time, migration to Saudi Arabia was normalized through the Egypt-
Saudi rapprochement: "Recall the writings of [philosopher] Ibn Khaldun," one 
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interviewee argued, "who wrote that the defeated eventually imitates the victor: 
the Naksa [Egypt's defeat or, literally, 'setback,' in the 1967 War], on one side 
and the importance of oil from the conservative Gulf in the [1973] Ramadan 
War, on the other, explains the allure of Saudi Arabia for Egyptians in the 
1970s, and their rejection of Nasserism." Ostentatious piety was the Egyptian 
subjects' reaction to religious practices of power introduced across the entire 
social body: this pressure was magnified through patterns of conspicuous 
consumption among return migrants from the Gulf, complementing the 
President's own, widely reported penchant for extravagance."R Interviewees 
would easily recall, some forty years later, the finely made, and conservative, 
clothing that migrants wore upon their return to Egypt in the late 1970s, or 
their imported record players, blasting Qur' anic recitations in the evenings-
both serving as simultaneous indications oflavishness and piety69 
Gradually, the Sadat regime introduced status hierarchies that, 
predicated upon the question of migration, were to become bases of social 
discrimination and exclusion. This shift targeted schoolchildren, not only 
adults: Egyptian school curricula now taught that "people emigrate, just like 
the birds,"") while the 1977 preparatory school certificate exam asked students 
to write an essay on "the joys of a person who could obtain work in an 'Arab' 
country, thus managing to accumulate money and return home to start a new 
life."71 From November 1971 onwards, the first son of an Egyptian emigrant 
would not be drafted into military conscription, nor would his brother if they 
were orphans.72 
How these practices of power came to be deployed at the micro-level 
of everyday life has been most obvious in one of the central tenets of Egyptian 
life, lnarriage, which becmne intertwined with elnigration and return. While, 
under Nasser, renting a new apartment was easily attainable for newlywed 
couples, Sadat deregulated rent controls, and shifted the state's priorities 
towards home ownership.73 The social expectation of moving into a new 
apartment-a near-necessity for any newly married Egyptian couple-became 
predicated upon sufficient prior savings for the hefty down-payment. New 
apartments' soaring prices (due, in part, to Egypt's urbanization and 
overpopulation issues), together with the rising costs of furnishing an 
apartment, entrenched migration into the normative frames of young 
Egyptians' quotidian lives. Whereas in the pre-1970 period, Egyptians could 
afford to get married after a couple of years of public sector employment, 
Egyptians after Sadat now either choose to emigrate or, if they remain in Egypt, 
accept being unable to marry for the foreseeable future. 
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Thus, the traditional social expectation that the prospective couple 
must save a certain amount of Inaney so as to move into a new home after the 
wedding is now achievable primarily through work abroad. As a result, young 
return migrants tend to be highly sought after as bridegrooms. A prospective 
groom's status as a returnee from the Gulf countries (or, pre-20l1, from Libya) 
is typically highlighted in social interactions, contributing to his valorization 
as a financially successful and, at the same time, pious Egyptian. Through 
marriage, relations of power that involve the act of migration become 
materially grounded in the local setting. Egyptians who have secured a position 
of work abroad also enjoy a dominant role under these social conditions; in 
that case, an engagement takes place, following which the fiance departs for 
abroad, where he saves money for a few years before he returns to his new 
home, and family, in Egypt. Periodic journeys abroad for additional 
elTIployment are not rare. 74 
Collectively, the regime's discourse on migration highlighted the shift 
towards individualism and de-politicization. 75 Every Egyptian citizen, Sadat 
would argue repeatedly, has the right to "get married, own a villa, drive a car, 
possess a television set and a stove, and eat three meals a day." 76 The 
socioeconomic autarky professed under Nasser was duly replaced as the Sadat 
regime shifted towards economic liberalization, a trend that would be 
intensified under Mubarak's turn to neoliberalism. 77 Stressing this even 
further, Sadat introduced Presidential Decree No. 73 in 1971, allowing 
Egyptians who had emigrated to regain their old civil service position in Egypt 
within a year, if they were unsuccessful in finding employment abroad-a 
period later expanded to three years.'8 At the same time, newspapers featured 
articles lauding the success of Egyptians abroad. In one instance, Ali Amin, 
editor of al-Akhbar wrote: 
Egypt's youthful skills have stolen the limelight and come to be the 
country's staple crop. Some of them get higher salaries than [US 
Secretary of State, 1973-77] Dr. Henry Kissinger and [UK Prime 
Minister, 1974-76] Harold Wilson while still in their forties. Some 
lead the same lavish life as Hollywood stars. They own villas with 
fragrant gardens and as many as three cars each. One of them travels 
by private helicopter from his country home to his place of work inside 
New York! But our country will not lose the brains we export to the 
outside world. For a successful Egyptian must be back home one day 
 
ṭ ṭ
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such as the Kijaya (Enough), or the Egyptian Movement for Change, were 
mostly elite-led projects rather than bottom-up campaigns. 
Overall, through social norms and expectations, the Egyptian regime 
under Sadat and Mubarak refocused subjects' fields of action around the issue 
of migration. Having succeeded in normalizing migration as a political act 
since the early 1970s, the regime proceeded to tie it to specific meanings-
freedom, piety, individualism, and neoliberal de-politicization-and shape 
citizens' engagement with power around them. As writer Anis Mansour 
encapsulates in al-Akhbar: 
[ ... J an Egyptian was looked upon as the man with the 'ugly face' 
throughout the Arab world. For twenty years, every Egyptian had 
seemed to turn into a spy or saboteur. Every Egyptian teacher was 
thought to have come to overthrow the standing rule and to distribute 
subversive literature. Every Egyptian doctor was considered a spy 
acting for Egyptian Intelligence Service to set one class against 
another. [ ... J Now he is not interested in other peoples' own affairs. 
'Give and take' is his motto. By doing so he carne to have a handsome 
face. 88 
CONCLUSION 
'The days when a citizen living abroad was regarded with suspicion, as ifhe had not 
fulfilled his national duties, are over ... We must all guarantee, in deeds and not in 
words, that an Egyptian working abroad is a good citizen, who has not renounced his 
identity.' 
Hosni Mubarak, Speech to Egyptian Expatriates' Meeting, 198389 
This paper explored how approaching migration as a political act within a 
community sheds light onto the effects of cross-border population mobility 
upon migrants' countries of origin. Specifically, it examined how processes 
related to migration are embedded in both governmental practices and social 
norms of interaction, and how these processes affect the subject. In this 
reading, migration is deeply entrenched within different structures of power; 
the act of migration arguably signifies less an act that affirms agency, or the 
subject's sovereignty, than a deeper entrenchment of the subject within social 
norms and practices, as well as within the governmental techniques of power 
that govern and delineate conduct. In this sense, migration carries moral 







In examining population movements in the empirical case of the post-
1952 modern Egyptian state, the paper traces how migration discursively 
supported the Egyptian regime, both under Nasser and under Sadat and 
Mubarak. The divergent ideological priorities of each period were duly 
reflected upon migration: the citizen as a migrant was, in the first case, 
demonized and, in the second, praised. Thus, social expectations, in tandem 
with formal governmental policies, contributed to different definitions of 
citizenship-the Egyptian citizen was constructed as a self-sustained, frugal 
subject under Nasser, and as a 'free,' profit-seeking subject under Sadat and 
Mubarak. In either of these cases, migration as an act became firmly embedded 
within a broader, socially constituted frame of reference that distinguished 
between the migrant and the non-migrant subject, and defined citizens' 
engagement with political power. 
NOTES 
IOn political participation, see: S. P. Huntington and J. M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: 
Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1976); N. Nielson and S. Wright, eds., Power and Participatory Development: 
Theory and Practice (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995). For an 
analysis of the Middle Eastern context, see C. Tripp, "Acting and Acting Out: 
Conceptions of Political Participation in the Middle East," in Comparative Political 
Thought: Theorizing Practices, in M. Freeden and A. Vincent, ed. (London: Taylor & 
Francis, 2013). 
2 W. S. Lewis, Louis Althusser and the Traditions of French Marxism (Oxford: 
Lexington Books, 2005). 
3 Indicatively: G. Amin and E. Awni, Hijrat al- 'Amalat al-Misriyya: Dirasa Naqdiyya 
/i-I-Buhuth wa-I-Dirasat al-Khasa bi-Hijrat al- 'Amalat al-Misriyya ita al-Kharij [in 
Arabic] (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1986). 
'Indicatively: N. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the 
Middle East (London: LB. Taw'is, 1995). 
~ The Sadat and Mubarak regimes are examined together given that no notable 
qualitative change in Egypt's emigration policy is detected: Sadat had picked 
Mubarak to be his successor, and the latter pledged to uphold key policy aspects, 
while also maintaining most of his predecessor's advisors. On this aspect, see G. 
Amin, Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak: 1981-2011 (Cairo: American University in 
Cairo Press, 2012),57. 
 
 
Subject-Making Processes 45 
6 The emphasis of the analysis on the Egyptian President is due to the traditional 
centrality of this figure in the decision-making power structures in Egypt. See B. 
Korany and A. E. H. Dessouki, eds., The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The 
Challenge of Globalization, 3rd cd., (Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press, 
2008),40-41. 
7 For a discussion of conducting fieldwork on migration policies in non-democracies, 
see: G. Tsourapas, "Notes from the Field: Researching Emigration in post-2011 
Egypt," American Political Science Association Migration & Citizenship Newsletter 2, 
no.2 (2014). 
I:! F. Ragazzi, "Governing Diasporas," Tnternational Political Sociology 3 no. 4 (2009); 
B. Mullan and C. Dofia-Reveco, "Emigration and the Sending State," in The 
International Handbook of Migration Studies, in S. Gold and S. N awyn, eds. (London: 
Routledge, 2012); M. Collyer, ed., Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of 
Emigrant Engagement (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
'1 Kapur, for instance, argues that migration includes four "channels," namely 
prospect, absence, diaspora, and return. Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The 
Domestic Impact of International Migration from India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2010). 
10 E Morawska, "Disciplinary Agendas and Analytic Strategies of Research on 
Immigrant Transnationalism: Challenges of Interdisciplinary Knowledge," 
International Migration Review 37, no. 3 (2003). 
11 L. Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity (London: 
Hurst & Company, 201 I); M. Cooke and B. B. Lawrence, eds., Muslim Networks: 
From Hajj To Hip Hop (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005). 
12 T. lyons and P. G. Mandaville, Politics from Afar (london: Hurst & Company, 
2011). 
13 P. Levitt and D. Lamba-Nieves, "Social Remittances Revisited," Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies 37, no. 1 (2010). 
14 N. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Rejraming Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999),5. Cf. M. Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern 
Society, 2nd e.d (london: Sage, 2010). 
15 S. Ismail, "Authoritarian Government, Neoliberalism and Everyday Civilities in 
Egypt," Third World Quarterly 32, no. 5 (201 1),864. 
16 A. Ong, "Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making: Immigrants Negotiate Racial and 
Cultural Boundaries in the United States," Current Anthropology 37, no. 5, (1996); S. 
B. Coutin, Nations of Emigrants: Shifting Boundaries of Citizenship in El Salvador and 
the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007). 
17 R. M. Rodriguez and H. Schwenken, "Becoming a Migrant at Home: Subjectivation 
Processes in Migrant-Sending Countries Prior to Departure," Population, Space and 








Subject-Making Processes 47 
35 For Issawi, Egyptians are some of "the most sedentary people in the world." Egypt 
in Revolution: An Economic Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 82. 
See also G Baer, Population and Society in the Arab East (New York, NY: Praeger, 
1964),28. 
3<, AI-Ahram al-iqtisadi, january 7,1963,26. 
3C AI-/umhuriya, 14 September 1954 and 15 September 1954. 
38 On this aspect of Nasser, see G. Amin, Egypt in the Era ofHosni Mubarak: 1981-
2011, 30-34. 
39 UAR Information Department, Nasser's Speeches and Press - Interviews (Cairo: 
UAR Information Department, 1958),246-47. 
40 AI-Kitab al-Sanawi [in Arabic] (Cairo: UAR Information Department, 1959),20. 
41 Nasser's Speeches and Press -interviews (Cairo: UAR Information Department, 
1959). 
42 See R. W. Baker, Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 197-217. 
43 See, for instance, N. Choucri, "The New Migration in the Middle East: A Problem 
for Whom?" international Migration Review 1, no. 4 (1977), 5-6. 
44 Almost all my interviewees insisted that Egyptians did not move abroad under 
Nasser; only when pressed about specific population groups did a more elaborate 
discussion take place about Nasser's migration policy. 
45 UAR Information Department, Nasser's Speeches and Press - Interviews, 1959,388. 
46 In Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, the words mil a !fashion) and il a (room) rhyme. 
The line above is part of a longer popular song. 
" AI-Ahram, 5 july 1970. 
"AI-/umhuriya, 29 March 1974: AI-Ahram, 15 May 1974. 
49 AI-Akhbar, 18 October 1971; AI-Ahram, 15 December 1971. 
oc, AI-/umhuriya, 3 March 1974. 
51 AI-Ahram, 10 january 1972. 
52 AI-/umhuriya, 6 February 1972. 
~3 J. Waterbury, "Egyptian Elite Perceptions of the Population Problem," Fieldstaff 
Reports: Africa: Northeast Africa Series (Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field 
Staff, 1973), 11-12. 
~1 For a broader discussion of this issue, see N. Ayubi, The State and Public Policies in 
Egypt Since Sadat. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1991). 
55 R. A. Ahmed, "Egyptian Migrations," 322. 
56 Ministry of Planning, Planningfor Economic Development in Egypt (Cairo: 
Ministry of Planning, 1978),8,36. 
" Arab Republic of Egypt, Dustur /umhuriyat Misr al- 'Arabiyya [in Arabic] (Cairo: 
Ministry of Information, 1971), Article 52. 






"Quoted in M. N. Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt (London: Croom Helm, 
1982),97. 
60 Personal Interview, Mr. Kareem Amin (Head of Cabinet, Department of Consular 
Affairs and Egyptians Abroad, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs); 20 February 
2014. 
" j. S. Birks, C. A. Sinclair, and j. Socknat, "The Demand for Egyptian Labor 
Abroad," in Migration, Mechanization, and Agricultural Labor Markets in Egypt, in 
A. Richards and P. L. Martin, eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 117. 
62 Al-Ahram, 10 October 1971. 
63 G. Feiler, The Number of Egyptian Workers in the Arab Oil Countries, ] 974-] 983: A 
Critical Discussion (Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Shiloah 
Institute, Tel Aviv University, 1986), 11. 
61 Personal Interview, Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (Director, Ibn Khaldun Center); 21 
October 2013. 
65 Al-Akhbar, 30 August 1974. 
66 Al-Ahram, 1 August 1974: al-Akhbar, 4 August 1974. 
Co, Al-Jumhuriya, 9 March 1974. 
68 R. Israeli, "Man of Defiance: A Political Biography of Anwar Sadat," (london: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983),6-12. 
69 The Egyptian "Islamic Revival" has been extensively researched in anthropology. 
Indicatively, see C. Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and 
Islamic Counterpublics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009). For two 
classic sociological accounts, see G. Amin, "Migration, Inflation and Social Mobility: 
A Sociological Interpretation of Egypt's Current Economic and Political Crisis," in 
Egypt under Mubarak, in C. Tripp and R. Owen, eds., (london: Taylor & Francis, 
1989): S. E. Ibrahim, The New Arab Social Order: A Study of the Social Impact of Oil 
Wealth (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 1982. 
'" AI-Ahram al-lqtisadi, No. 745,1983. 
71 Al-Ahram, 18 May 1977. 
72 Al-Ahram, 26 December 1971. 
73 See M. Hanna, Uridu Maskanan: Mushkilah Lana Hall [in Arabic] (Cairo: Ruz al 
YusufFoundation,1978). 
71 Egyptian emigration to the Arab world has been historically male-dominated. For 
an anthropological discussion of this phenomenon, see F. Ghannam, Live and Die 
Like a Man: Gender Dynamics in Urban Egypt (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 
Press),2013. 
75 For a broader discussion on this see, G. Tsourapas, "Why Do States Develop Multi-
Tier Emigrant Policies: Evidence from Egypt," Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 41, no. 13 (2015). 
n Quoted in Remaking the Modern: Space, Relocation, and the Politics ofTdentity in a 
Global Cairo (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 29. Very similar 
statements were made in President Sadat's two-hour interviews on Egyptian 
 
ʻ
̄ʻ ̄ʻ ̄
